Over both short and long horizons, IPOs with greater institutional shareholdings outperform those with smaller institutional shareholdings. Over a one-quarter horizon, institutions can identify firms that beat market benchmarks. Over the long-run, however, institutions' advantage lies entirely in their ability to avoid firms that exhibit the worst performance. Institutions appear to rely heavily on readily available firm and offer characteristics when making their investment decisions. In contrast, individual investors are less likely to consider such characteristics and, as a result, they invest disproportionately in poorly performing firms. However, a simple strategy of investing in higher quality firms, for example, firms with positive earnings prior to the IPO, would enable individuals to avoid much of this underperformance.
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I. Introduction
Initial public offerings (IPOs) are an extremely attractive investment opportunity when they first come to market but are less attractive over subsequent years. The average initial return from day 0 to day 1 is approximately 19%, while the annual raw return over the following five years averages only 5% Ritter, 2004, 1995) . In fact, IPOs have consistently earned lower returns than the S&P 500 over long horizons, and Brav and Gompers (1997) show that small, non-venture backed IPOs underperform even size and bookto-market matched portfolios. The objective of this paper is to examine the investment s of institutional investors, who are presumably aware of this evidence. One potential explanation for institutions' investment patterns in IPOs is that they are able ex ante to discriminate firm quality. Indeed, not all IPOs are poor investments. Over the past 20 years, the top 100 IPOs earned over 1000% in the first three years, compared to -99% for the bottom 100. The challenge for investors is to identify such winners and losers ahead of time. In the IPO market in particular, institutional investors may have a distinct advantage over individuals. Institutions have connections to venture capitalists and underwriters, and they are invited to road shows where they can obtain firm-and offer-specific information.
From the San Francisco Chronicle in August 2004, "In a typical road show, large clients of the lead underwriters are invited to lunch at fancy hotels, where the company going public spills beans that weren't included in the prospectus. This supposedly gives the large investors an edge over the poor schmoes who weren't invited."
If institutions possess an informational advantage over individuals, then institutions may be better able to identify the quality of firms issuing IPOs. Consistent with this conjecture, newly public firms with larger institutional shareholdings tend to perform better over several horizons than those with little institutional interest. However, the source of institutions' higher returns is different at short versus long investment horizons.
Over short horizons, institutions are able to identify venture-backed firms that outperform market benchmarks. It is possible that institutions have a particular advantage within this class of firms because venture capitalists share value-relevant information with them. In contrast, over longer horizons of one to three years, we find no evidence that institutions can systematically identify the best performers in any sector of the IPO market.
Over these long-run horizons, the difference in performance between firms with high and low institutional investment is driven entirely by the significantly negative abnormal returns of firms with little or no institutional interest.
These results suggest that individual investors experience the greatest IPO underperformance. To more directly examine this conjecture, we isolate firms with no institutional presence shortly after the IPO -that is, firms with only individual investors. We show that these firms are more likely to have negative pre-IPO earnings and lower pre-IPO working capital ratios. Consistent with having poor pre-IPO fundamentals, these firms do not do well subsequently: their earnings become significantly more negative in the years after the IPO and their average stock returns are 16% below size and book-to-market matched firms.
Moreover, these firms are extremely unlikely to ever garner institutional interest, suggesting that it is predominantly individuals who experience this underperformance. 3 Finally, we examine the relation between long-run returns and publicly available information about offer quality. Consistent with Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) , we find that publicly available information is significantly related to post-IPO firm performance. Teoh et al. show that firms with unusually high accruals in the year of the IPO underperform those firms with low accruals. We find that even simpler measures of firm quality, which individuals could easily obtain, are significantly related to future firm performance.
Specifically, individuals could avoid the worst performers by simply investing in firms brought public by higher ranked underwriters and backed by venture capitalists, and in firms with more working capital and positive earnings prior to the IPO. For example, a portfolio of firms with above-median ranked underwriters outperforms one with below-median ranked underwriters by approximately fifty basis points per month over the three years following the offering. In sum, much of institutions' advantage over individuals appears to be driven by institutions 'doing their homework' -individuals would benefit greatly by doing theirs.
Our results are consistent with a growing body of literature suggesting that institutions have an advantage over individuals. Studies of the stocks that institutions and mutual funds purchase indicate that these agents have significant ability to pick stocks that outperform benchmarks (e.g., Titman (1989, 1992) , Nofsinger and Sias (1999) , and Wermers (2000) ). Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003) find that institutions tend to sell to individuals in the year prior to forced CEO turnovers, in part because they are better information on the prospects of the firm. Gibson, Safieddine, and Sonti (2004) show that SEO firms with the largest increases in institutional investment around the offering earn significantly higher abnormal returns than those with the greatest decreases. Chemmanur, He, and Hu (2005) find that institutions possess private information about SEOs, and they are able to obtain greater allocations in better offerings. Chen, Harford, and Li (2004) document that institutions decrease their holdings in firms that subsequently make poor acquisitions. In a sample of 441 IPOs between 1997 , Boehmer, Boehmer, and Fishe (2005 find that underwriters provide institutions with more shares in firms that subsequently perform better.
Our paper contributes to this literature in several ways. First, using a large, comprehensive sample of IPOs over a 21-year period, we demonstrate that the source of institutions' advantage over individuals differs by investment horizon, with institutions beating market benc hmarks only at very short horizons, but successfully avoiding the firms that tend to perform the worst over longer periods. Second, we find that institutional investors use publicly available firm and offer characteristics in choosing their IPO investments, but individuals are more likely to disregard such quality measures. Third, we demonstrate that the most severe long-run IPO underperformance is concentrated in firms that attract only individual investors. Finally, our results indicate that while individuals suffer the most underperformance, this need not be the case -individuals could avoid the worst underperformers by simply paying closer attention to firm fundamentals.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data and methodology.
Section III presents evidence on institutional investment patterns in IPOs over the past 21 years. Section IV examines the relation between these institutional holdings and IPO longrun performance, and Section V examines the determinants of institutional investment. In Section VI, we focus our attention on firms with only individual investors, and Section VII seeks to determine whether individual investors could earn higher returns by paying more attention to fundamentals. Section VIII concludes.
II. Data and Methodology
Our dataset consists of firms that went public between 1980 and 2000, as listed on the Securities Data Company (SDC) database. We omit financial institutions (SIC codes 6000-6999), utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999), closed-end funds, ADRs, unit offerings, and IPOs with an offer price less than five dollars. Firms are also required to have CRSP data. Our final sample consists of 5907 IPOs.
For each firm, we collect the offer date, offer price, initial file range, proceeds, underwriter name(s), whether the issue was backed by a venture capitalist, and the overallotment option (if available) from SDC. We use Carter and Manaster's (1990) measures of underwriter quality, as updated by Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) and Loughran and Ritter (2004) , to rank each underwriter. Ranks range from zero to nine, with higher ranks representing higher quality underwriters. We define the price run-up as the percent difference between the midpoint of the filing range and the offer price, and we compute the initial return as the percent difference between the offer price and the first after-market closing price from CRSP, where this price must be within 14 days of the offer date. We also collect data on the age for firms in our sample, where age represents the number of years since the company was founded. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003) . See Appendix 1 of Loughran and Ritter (2004) for a complete description.
Since 1978, the SEC has required all institutions with more than $100 million of securities under discretionary management to report holdings of all common stock positions greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000 on a quarterly basis (at the end of March, June, September, and December). 5 We obtain these data on 13F institutional ownership in electronic form from CDA/Spectrum for 1980-2000. Specifically, for each IPO firm we obtain the total number of shares owned by each institution. Venture Partners). Second, we omit any institution that is listed as owning more than 15% of the shares offered in the IPO. This is based on the assumption that one entity is extremely
unlikely to obtain such a large stake after the firm goes public, suggesting that it probably owned these shares prior to the IPO.
We define institutio nal ownership percentage as the number of shares owned by institutions divided by the estimated public float. For a recent IPO, the float should be approximately equal to the total number of shares offered in the IPO, which is equal to shares offered as listed in the prospectus plus the overallotment option. 6 In cases where sufficient 5 It is not unusual for 13F institutions to report ownership levels that fall below the minimum reporting requirements. Of the 73,930 13F filings by institutions for our IPO sample, 8, 337 (or 11%) of them hold fewer than 10,000 shares and an equity position of less than $200,000.
data are available, this is the formula we use to obtain the float. Because SDC does not provide data on the over-allotment option sold for all issues, in some cases we mus t estimate it. Based on Aggarwal's (2000) findings regarding the relation between the initial return and the size of the over-allotment option, we assume that those issues with an initial return less than or equal to 5% have a float equal to 105% of shares offered. For those issues with an initial return greater than 5%, the float equals 115% of shares offered. Using these estimates, average (median) institutional ownership as a percent of the public float equals 25% (24%). In order to compare the performance of firms according to their level of institutional ownership, we form portfolios based on institutional ownership. The simplest approach would be to rank all IPOs based on the percent of shares owned by institutions and form portfolios based on this ranking. However, as indicated by Figure 1, 
where INST i,t is the institutional holdings for firm i (as a percent of public float) measured at underwriter rank, or leverage. Across the entire sample, the average book-to-market ratio is 0.40, the average underwriter rank is 7.0, and median leverage is 66.2%.
III. Institutional Investment Patterns
Stoll and Curley (1970), Ritter (1991) , Loughran and Ritter (1995) , and Ritter and Welch (2002) find that IPOs tend to significantly underperform a variety of benchmarks. Brav and Gompers (1997) show that this underperformance is concentrated among small, non-venture backed IPOs. The first panel of Table 2 confirms that similar patterns also exist in our sample. Intercepts from four-factor regressions of equally weighted monthly post-IPO returns over a three-year time horizon indicate that on average, IPOs experience significant underperformance in the three years after the IPO. 10 As shown in the Brav and Gompers (1997) ).
The third panel of Table 2 shows that institutional investors hold a significantly greater percentage of venture-backed firms (average 28% vs. 24%; median 27% versus 22%).
Moreover, the difference between venture-and non-venture backed IPOs is most substantial among the smallest firms: on average, institutions hold 20% of small, venture backed IPOs versus only 13% of small, non-venture backed IPOs (median 17% vs. 7%). These statistics suggest that institutional investors are aware of the evidence on the poor performance of small, non-venture backed IPOs, and accordingly, they are more cautious about investing in this class of firms.
The fourth panel of Table 2 bears this out: institutional shareholders own shares in 85% of non-venture backed IPOs, whereas they hold shares in 96% of venture-backed IPOs.
Looking back at the top two panels of Table 2 , this is an interesting observation, as IPO underperformance -both in the long-and short-run -is concentrated among non-venture backed firms (particularly small, non-venture backed firms). Clearly, institutional shareholders seem to recognize that non-venture backed IPO firms do not perform well, and thus, they are more selective when investing in these firms.
Focusing on size, we see similar patterns when we compare the institutional ownership of small and large firms to the average performance of these firms. Consistent with small firms performing more poorly, institutional presence in these firms is significantly lower (76% for small firms vs. 98% for large ones). Finally, consistent with small, non-venture firms performing particularly poorly, institutions invest in only 70% of these firms, compared to over 90% of firms in almost every other VC, size subgroup.
While institutions invest in significantly fewer small, non-venture backed IPOs, it is perhaps surprising that their presence is as large as it is. Given that these firms experience such great underperformance, even in the very short-run, one might wonder why institutions invest in this class at all. The next section examines whether institutions can differentiate the quality of the firm a priori, beyond its size and venture backing.
IV. Relation Between Long -Run IPO Returns and Institutional Holdings
If institutions are "informed" investors (Michaely and Shaw (1994) and Badrinath, Kale, and Noe (1995) ), then IPO firms with higher institutional shareholdings should outperfo rm those with lower institutional shareholdings. As discussed in depth in this section, our findings suggest that this is, in fact, the case. In light of this evidence, we try to understand the source of the higher returns for firms with larger institutional investment. For example, is the significant relation between institutional investment and post-IPO returns entirely attributable to institutions' tendency to invest more in those sectors of the IPO market that perform better? Alternatively, are institutions able to further discriminate firm quality, and, if so, how do they do this ?
IV.A. Descriptive Evidence on Long-Run Returns
We base our empirical tests on the five institutional holdings portfolios described in Section II, where Quintile 1 (Q1) has the lowest institutional holdings and Quintile 5 (Q5) has the highest. Table 1 ). Figure 2 suggests that a strategy of buying Q5 and shorting Q1 would earn excess returns at each horizon, using either raw or abnormal returns.
11 Specifically, buy-and-hold returns represent compounded monthly returns, and cumulative returns represent summed monthly returns.
IV.B. Four-Factor Regressions and Calendar Time Abnormal Returns
As noted by Fama (1998) , cross-correlations between firm returns prevent accurate significance tests from being conducted on long-run, event time, buy-and-hold and cumulative abnormal returns. Thus, we rely on four-factor regressions to test the significance of the relations suggested in Figure 2 .
12 Tables 3 and 4 show regressions of monthly retur ns of the high institutional quintile (Q5) minus the low institutional quintile (Q1) on the three FamaFrench factors plus the Carhart momentum factor. Following Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) , the factors include the market return minus the risk-free rate (RMRF), returns on a portfolio of small firms minus returns on a portfolio of big firms (SMB), returns on a high BM portfolio minus returns on a low BM portfolio (HML), and returns on a high momentum portfolio minus returns on a low momentum portfolio (PR12). To account for the effects of hot issue markets, regressions are estimated using weighted least squares, where each monthly return is weighted by the number of IPOs in the portfolio. The intercept from such a regression can be interpreted as a measure of abnormal performance. Table 3 shows four-factor regressions over one-quarter, one-year, and three-year time horizons, meaning that a firm is included in the regression sample for the first three, twelve, and thirty-six months, respectively, after its first institutional reporting date (or until its delisting date if delists before this). The results are generally consistent with inferences from the BHARs and CARs shown in Figure 2 . Using equally weighted returns, we find a significant intercept for all three horizons, suggesting that a strategy of investing in firms with high institutional holdings and shorting those with low institutional holdings would earn significant abnormal returns. 13 Using value-weighted returns, intercepts are significant at the one-and three-year horizons. Table 3 indicates that institutions do better, on average, on their IPO investments than individuals. Table 4 attempts to shed light on how institutions achieve their higher returns.
For example, institutions may have a particular advantage within certain classes of firms.
Alternatively, institutions' higher returns may be driven merely by higher investment in those types of firms that tend to perform better, e.g., VC-backed firms. To examine these issues, we form six groups based on VC-backing and size, where the size categorization consists of terciles based on market capitalization as of the first institutional reporting date. Within each of these six groups of firms, we regress returns on the Q5 -Q1 portfolio on the four factors described above (similar to Table 3 ). Table 4 shows intercepts from each of these regressions over one quarter, one year, and three year horizons.
Focusing first on the one-quarter results, Table 4 shows that the abnormal returns shown in Table 3 over this short horizon are driven entirely by the venture backed sample. In fact, venture backed firms with high institutional ownership outperform those with low institutional ownership by 3.3% per month in the first quarter. At longer horizons, however, we see a different pattern emerge. While we continue to find significant intercepts on the Q5-Q1 portfolios, the source of these abnormal returns is non-venture backed firms. For horizons of one and three years, returns for non-venture backed firms with the largest institutional shareholdings are between 7% and 10% per annum higher than those with the 13 Gompers and Metrick (2001) find that greater demand pressure in stocks with the most institutional investment causes these stocks' returns to be higher. However, in our sample we find that institutional investment in the Q1 firms increases faster than that in the Q5 firms over the first 12 quarters after the IPO. This suggests that the higher returns of the Q5 firms are not driven by heavier institutional buying, and thus greater demand pressure, in these stocks.
smallest institutional shareholdings (monthly intercepts between 0.006 and 0.009). In contrast, we find no such evidence for the venture backed sample at longer horizons.
Finally, Table 4 indicates that institutions' advantage does not come solely from heavier investments in the venture, size groupings that tend to perform better. If that was the case, the Q5-Q1 positive abnormal return would disappear once we controlled for these factors, meaning we would not see positive abnormal returns within any of the VC, size subgroups. However, we do see significant alphas for many of these subgroups. For example, institutions appear to successfully differentiate firm quality within the small tercile firms at every horizon. At the one-quarter horizon, where institutions have an advantage among VC-backed firms, we find significantly positive intercepts within the venture backed, small size tercile. Analogously, at the one-and three-year horizons, where institutions'
advantage lies in non-venture backed firms, we find significant intercepts within the non-VC backed, small size terciles. Although the Q5-Q1 strategy yields abnormal returns within some of the other size/venture subgroups, we find no systematic pattern among these other portfolios.
So why does this strategy of investing in firms with high institutional shareholdings and shorting those with low institutional shareholdings provide positive abnormal returns?
The positive alphas could come from two different sources: high returns for firms with large institutional ownership or low returns for firms with small institutional ownership (since our portfolio measures returns for Q5-Q1). That is, are institutions choosing winners in Quintile 5, or are they avoiding losers in Quintile 1? Table 5 investigates by providing intercepts from four-factor regressions for each of the five institutional ownership quintiles for the full sample and also delineated by venture backing.
Results in the first panel of Table 5 suggest that over short horizons, institutions have some ability to identify both the worst and the best performers. Looking at returns measured over one quarter, firms with the lowest levels of institutional investment (Q1) earn significantly negative abnormal returns, indicating that institutions successfully avoid the worst performers. In addition, venture-backed IPOs with the highest levels of institutional investment (Q5) earn significantly positive abnormal returns. That is, among venture-backed IPOs, institutions are able to identify firms that significantly outperform market benchmarks over one quarter.
However, at longer horizons (see the second and third panels of Table 5 ), none of the quintiles earn positive abnormal returns. The positive returns of Q5 minus Q1 over the oneyear and three-year periods are driven entirely by the poor performance of the Q1 firms, particularly for non-venture backed firms. Thus, institutional investors do not seem to have any ability to choose firms that perform extraordinarily well over the long-run. Rather, the difference in long-run returns between firms with high and low institutional interest reflects the fact that institutions invest less in firms that subsequently suffer the worst long-run underperformance.
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IV.C. Discussion of Returns Evidence
Results in the previous section suggest that institutional investments shortly after the IPO contain information regarding both the short-run and long-run performance of these firms. However, the information content differs according to the horizon. These findings lead to the following questions. First, why can institutions identify the 'winners' only over short periods? Second, can investors benefit from our findings? We discuss each of these questions in turn.
To shed light on the first question, we examine the length of time institutions tend to hold their IPO investments. If institutions identify 'winners' over only short periods, perhaps they tend to hold short-term positions in IPOs. In a study of mostly seasoned firms, Wermers (2000) finds that institutions frequently divest their positions after short periods, suggesting that they may expend more effort in forecasting firm performance over relatively short horizons. Consistent with Wermers' evidence regarding more seasoned firms and our findings in Table 5 showing that institutions invest in better performing firms only over the short-run, we find that institutions generally do not hold IPOs for long periods. Over 60% of institutions divest their initial holdings before the end of the first year and almost 80% have divested by the end of the second year. In comparison, only 27% of institutions increase their initial holdings between the end of the first quarter after the IPO and one year later, and just 16% by two years later (results not tabulated).
Turning to our second question of whether investors could benefit from our findings, the significant abnormal returns from a strategy of going long Q5 and shorting Q1seem to suggest an arbitrage opportunity. In fact, however, it is only an actual arbitrage opportunity if one can short Q1. Notably, D'Avolio's (2002) findings suggest that a lack of institutional interest in these Q1 firms may result in a scarcity of shares available to short. For the oneand three-year horizons, the abnormal returns from the Q5-Q1 strategy are entirely driven by the low performance of the Q1 firms. Thus, it is unlikely that our findings provide investors with a strategy to earn positive abnormal returns over these periods. For the one-quarter horizon, the significantly positive performance of the Q5 firms contributes to the Q5-Q1 returns. Thus, an investor could benefit if he could identify these Q5 firms. However, institutional ownership data are generally not available until 45 days after the beginning of the quarter, i.e., midway through the quarter in which we find evidence of abnormal returns.
While it is unlikely that one could implement the Q5-Q1 strategy to earn arbitrage profits, it is possible that there are other ways that investors could benefit from our results.
For example, the finding that institutions are able to identify -and avoid -the poorest longrun performers potentially has implications for individual investors, who apparently invest disproportionately in newly-public firms that perform the worst over long horizons. Sections 5 and 6 focus on this issue.
V. How Do Institutions Choose Their IPO Investments?
Institutions potentially have both private and public information available to them when making IPO investments, but the majority of individuals have access only to public information. By focusing solely on readily available public information, this section provides insight into the extent to which individuals might be able to avoid those IPOs that exhibit the poorest long run performance.
Following Gompers and Metrick (2001) , we consider three types of public information that tend to influence cross-sectional variation in institutional ownership of firms: (i) the legal environment institutions face as fiduciaries ("prudence," see also Del Guercio, 1996),
(ii) liquidity and transaction cost motives, and (iii) historical return patterns.
Based on evidence presented in Del Guercio (1996), Muscarella, Peavy and Vetsuypens (1990) , Megginson and Weiss (1991) , and Carter and Manaster (1990), we include firm age, venture capital backing, and underwriter rank as proxies for prudence. We also include the following accounting information as measures of prudence: sales/assets, liabilities/assets, working capital/assets, and a dummy variable equal to one for firms with positive EBIT, all measured the year before the IPO. To determine whether liquidity and transaction cost motives are important for institutions, we include the log of real IPO proceeds measured in $1983 (similar in spirit to the firm size variable used by Gompers and Metrick).
Finally, to determine whether historic return patterns are important for institutions, we include price run-up as a measure of momentum. We also include yearly dummies to account for the overall increase in institutional ownership over time (coefficients not reported in table). Table 6 shows two measures of institutional ownership regressed on the above factors.
In the first column, the dependent variable equals institutional ownership as a percent of the public float, and in the second column the dependent variable is a dummy variable, equal to one if the firm has institutional ownership and zero otherwise. In both cases, institutional ownership is measured between one and four months after the IPO (consistent with earlier tables).
The findings in Column 1 of Table 6 are similar to the results reported by Gompers and Metrick for the entire market. Consistent with Gompers and Metrick, we find that liquidity motives are an important determinant of institutional holdings (as reflected by the significantly positive coefficient on proceeds). In addition, we find that four of our prudence measures -underwriter rank, VC backing, positive EBIT, and working capital/assets -are significant. 15 A comparison of our findings with those of both Gompers and Metrick and Del
Guercio suggests that prudence motives are slightly more important for IPO firms, perhaps because these firms are so much riskier than seasoned firms.
Interestingly, institutions appear to use slightly different criteria when evaluating venture versus non-venture backed firms. We estimate this same Table 6 regression for venture-backed and for non-venture backed IPOs (results not reported). The variables that were most significant across the whole sample are also significant for the two subsamples.
However, these nine publicly available measures explain 48% of the variation in institutional investment for non-venture backed firms, compared with only 28% for venture backed firms.
This evidence, in combination with the evidence provided earlier that institutions earn positive abnormal returns in the short-run for venture backed investments, suggests that institutions may be privy to information more proprietary in nature for these firms, possibly gleaned through ongoing relationships with venture capitalists.
Finally, comparing the OLS regression in Column 1 with the logit regression in
Column 2, we see that the determinants of whether an institution invests in an IPO company are similar to the determinants of the magnitude of institutional ownership. The biggest difference between the two regressions is price run-up: firms with a larger price run-up are less likely to obtain institutional ownership, but price run-up is not significantly related to the magnitude of institutional ownership. Other than price run-up, the most important factors in both regressions are proceeds, underwriter rank, and earnings: institutions are less likely to invest in firms with smaller proceeds, lower-ranked underwriters, and negative earnings.
16 16 We have also estimated this regression including market capitalization immediately after the IPO, but it is not significant. The finding that institutions focus on proceeds rather than market capitalization is consistent with institutions being most concerned with liquidity. Because many of the pre -IPO shares are locked-up following the offering, proceeds is a better metric of liquidity than market capitalization.
VI. Isolating Firms With No Institutional Investment
The evidence presented thus far indicates that firms with high institutional investment outperform those with low institutional investment and that institutional investments are strongly related to readily available public information. The remainder of the paper seeks to determine whether individuals could do better by paying more attention to similar public information measures. As a first step, this section examines the relation between individuals' apparent lack of attention to fundamentals and the poor long-run returns of those firms in which they invest.
To get the cleanest tests possible of how individuals fare when investing in IPOs, we isolate those firms without any institutional investment. Toward that end, rather than utilizing our institutional quintiles, we put firms into two distinc t groups: (1) firms with positive institutional investment as of the first institutional reporting date (the "Institutions" group), and (2) firms with zero institutional investment as of the same date (the "Individuals Only" group). The Institutions group consists of 5,256 firms (89% of total IPO sample), while the Individuals Only group consists of 651 firms (11% of total IPO sample). As one might expect, the average market capitalization of the "Individuals Only" firms is significantly smaller than tha t of the "Institutions" group. However, for purposes of our analysis, it is perhaps more important to note that the "Individuals Only" firms do not solely represent the smallest firms in our sample. For example, the median size of the "Individuals Only" group is $15.6 million, and 341 firms have a market capitalization below this. Notably, a similar number (349) of "Institutions" firms have a market capitalization below this same cutoff.
Thus, the substantial size difference is primarily driven by the fact that nearly all large firms have institutions ; notably, however, many (but not all) small firms also have institutional investors. Figure 3 shows accounting data for all IPOs delineated by institutional presence, where "Year -1" refers to the fiscal year immediately preceding the IPO, "IPO Year" refers to the fiscal year including the IPO, and "Year 1" and "Year 2" refer to the first two fiscal years after the IPO. At each point in time, we look at median EBIT/total assets, median retained earnings/total assets, median working capital/total assets, and the fraction of firms with positive earnings for our two groups. These apparent differences in firm quality become much more dramatic after the IPO.
VI.A. Accounting Fundamentals for Firms With and Without Post-IPO Institutional Investment
Looking at the fraction of firms with positive earnings, we see a drop over time for both groups, but the Institutions group always contains significantly more firms with positive earnings. Moreover, differences in the level of earnings (median EBIT/TA) between the two groups become highly significant starting in the year of the IPO. The Individuals Only firms'
EBIT/TA drops from a median of 9% before the IPO to only 2% during the IPO year and then becomes negative after that. In contrast, the Institutions firms' median EBIT/total assets experiences a modest drop from 10% to 9% between year -1 and year 0, and the median never becomes negative. Consistent with these patterns in earnings, Panel C shows that the Institutions group's retained earnings tend s to increase over time, while that for the Individuals Only group decreases rapidly. As a result, the difference between the two groups is significantly different in every period after year -1. Finally, similar to the patterns observed in year -1, Individuals Only firms have significantly lower working capital in years 1 and 2.
Overall, these accounting ratio results demonstrate that, along some dimensions, Individuals Only firms are of lower quality before the IPO, and the differences in quality become even more pronounced over time.
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VI.B Stock Returns and Firm Status for Firms With and Without Post-IPO Institutional Investment
The previous section shows that Individuals Only firms have significantly poorer accounting fundamentals both before and after the IPO. In Figure 4 , we see similar differences in stock returns. The firms with only individual investment clearly perform substantially worse. 18 In the three years post-IPO, the Individuals Only firms substantially underperform, earning 16% less than their size and book-to-market matched counterparts after three years.
Consistent with the returns evidence presented in Figure 4 , we also find that Individuals Only firms are substantially more likely to be delisted than are Institutions firms:
33% of all Individuals Only firms delist within five years of the IPO, compared with only 17 We have also estimated all the above relations on a sample of "Individuals Only" and "Institutions" firms that are more similar in size. Specifically, we base our tests on all firms with a market capitalization below $15.6 million (the median market capitalization of the "Individuals Only" firms). This results in a sample of 341 "Individuals Only" firms and 349 "Institutions" firms. Findings with respect to median EBIT/TA, the percent of firms with positive EBIT/TA and median RE/TA are all similar. We do not find significant differences in WC/TA using this alternative sample. 18 We also estimate four-factor regressions (not reported), where our dependent variable equals returns on a portfolio of firms with institutional investment minus returns on a portfolio of firms without institutional investment. Consistent with Figure 5 , we obtain a significantly positive intercept, indicating that the firms with institutional ownership perform significantly better.
13% of firms with institutional shareholdings.
VI.C Do the Individuals Only Firms Ever Attract the Attention of Institutional Investors?
The evidence presented in the previous section -that the Individuals Only firms experience substantially lower abnormal returns and are significantly more likely to be delisted -suggests that individuals bear the brunt of IPO underperformance. However, the evidence presented thus far is merely suggestive, as we have not investigated the possibility that institutional investors later buy into the Individuals Only firms. Given the evidence in Figure 4 that the Individuals Only firms substantially underperform those with institutional presence, as well as the finding that institutions are unlikely to ever invest in this class of firms, it is clear that individual investors suffer the worst IPO long-run underperformance.
VII. Can Individuals Do Better?
By isolating newly-public firms with only individual investors, we find direct evidence that individuals are more likely to invest in firms with poorer accounting fundamentals and lower long-run returns. In this section we examine the direct relation between these accounting fundamentals of IPO firms and their post-IPO returns. That is, how much better could individuals do by simply paying more attention to readily available firmand offer-specific information known at the IPO? Figure 6 and Table 7 examine average post-IPO returns, based upon the factors institutions seem to use in making their IPO investment decisions. From Table 6 , we know that institutions prefer venture capital backed IPOs, IPOs issued by higher ranked underwriters, IPOs with larger proceeds, firms with positive pre-IPO earnings, and firms with higher pre-IPO working capital. Thus, we bifurcate our sample based on each of these dimensions and then compare returns for each of the group s. Specifically, for underwriter rank, IPO proceeds, and WC/TA, we determine the median of companies going public in each year, and rank firms above or below that yearly median. We also examine the same returns measures for firms with positive versus nonpositive earnings in the year prior to the IPO, and venture versus non-venture backing.
Figure 6 provides descriptive evidence on the long-run returns of IPO firms based on these characteristics, and Table 7 tests the significance of these relations. Specifically, Figure 6 shows buy-and-hold abnormal returns, relative to size-and book-to-market matched firms, for quarterly horizons of one quarter through twelve quarters after the IPO. Because significance tests cannot be conducted on these event-time buy-and-hold returns, Table 7 shows intercepts from 4-factor regressions, where the dependent variable equals returns on various portfolios of firms that have gone public within the past 36 months. Specifically, for each characteristic, we form three portfolios: (1) Table 7 show that institutions are correct in paying attention to these readily available measures of firm and offer quality. For example, looking at Panel A of Figure 6 , a simple strategy of investing in firms with higher-ranked underwriters dominates a strategy of investing in firms with lower-ranked underwriters. Table 7 confirms that the difference is significant. Specifically, a portfolio of firms with above-ranked underwriters outperforms a portfolio of firms with below-ranked underwriters by approximately 50 basis points per month over the three years following the IPO. Table 7 also shows that firms with below-median underwriters significantly underperform market benchmarks, while firms with above-median underwriters do not exhibit underperformance during our sample period.
Similarly, VC-backed firms yield significantly higher returns than non-VC backed firms, and as shown in Panel B of Figure 6 , firms with positive EBIT, and higher working capital ratios prior to the IPO also significantly outperform their counterparts. Further, Table   7 shows that in each of these cases, what we deem the 'low quality' characteristic firms (i.e., non-VC backed, negative EBIT, and lower WC/TA) all earn significantly negative abnormal returns. Surprisingly, size of proceeds is not at all predictive of future stock performance.
While firms with positive EBIT and higher WC/TA perform significantly better, Figure 3 showed that individuals disproportionately invest in firms with negative EBIT and lower WC/TA. Similarly, while firms that are VC backed and have higher ranked underwriters are also more likely to perform better, findings in Table 6 suggest that individuals are more likely to invest in firms that are not VC backed and that have lower ranked underwriters. Individuals are disproportionately investing in the types of firms that, according to Table 7 , earn significantly negative abnormal returns over the long-run. This in large part explains why the Individuals Only firms perform so poorly. In sum, it would behoove individual investors to pay more attention to these readily available firm and offer characteristics when making long-run investments in IPOs.
VIII. Conclusion
This paper examines institutional investments shortly following the IPO. We find that newly public firms with high institutional shareholdings outperform those with low institutional shareholdings at various investment horizons. Much of institutions' advantage lies in their ability to avoid the worst-performing firms, and we observe that firms with the lowest levels of institutional investment significantly underperform over all horizons. In addition, institutions successfully identify the firms that perform best over short intervals.
Specifically, venture-backed firms with the highest levels of institutional investments beat market benchmarks over a one quarter interval after the IPO.
We find that institutional investors rely heavily on publicly available information when choosing the IPOs in which they invest -in particular, institutional investors prefer venture-backed firms, firms taken public by higher quality underwriters, firms issuing larger IPO proceeds, and firms with positive earnings and higher working capital ratios prior to the IPO.
To better understand the choices of individual investors, we isolate those firms with no institutional ownership. We find that such firms are more likely to have negative pre-IPO earnings and lower working capital before going public. These results suggest that individuals pay less attention to quality characteristics when choosing which IPOs to invest in. Moreover, we find that those firms with only individual investors significantly underperform those with institutional interest.
An examination of institutional ownership over time for firms with and without initial institutional presence provides additional evidence on individuals' investment returns.
Although the typical firm with institutional investors after the IPO continues to attract more institutional investment, most firms lacking initial institutional interest fail to garner the interest of institutional investors even years later. Together, these results imply that it is individual investors who bear the brunt of IPO underperformance.
Finally, we find that individuals could do substantially better in their IPO investments by paying more attention to readily available public information. Firms with positive EBIT and with lower working capital prior to the IPO, with higher ranked underwriters, and that are backed by venture capitalists significantly outperform their counterparts. It is puzzling why individuals continue to invest in these types of firms that perform so poorly. In fact, it is puzzling why these types of firms are able to go public at all. 
. We use the regression residual for each firm to group firms into quintiles, where Quintile 1 (Q1) represents firms with the lowest residual institutional ownership, and Quintile 5 (Q5) represents firms with the highest residual institutional ownership. Age is the age of IPO firms as they go public. Proceeds are the proceeds raised in the IPO, and Market Cap is the market capitalization, measured on the institutional holdings report date, both measured in 2000 million dollars. The bookto-market ratio is book value divided by market cap, where book value is measured as book value at the end of the first fiscal year after the IPO; Fraction Venture-Backed shows the percent of IPO firms with venture-capital backing; Underwriter Rank is the average Carter-Manaster (1990) underwriter ranking score, as updated by Loughran and Ritter (2004) ; Initial Return is the percent difference between the offer price and the first after-market closing price, as listed on CRSP; EBIT/TA is defined as earnings before interest and taxes during the fiscal year ending prior to the IPO, divided by total assets at the end of that fiscal year; and leverage t-1 is defined as total debt over total assets at the end of the fiscal year prior to the IPO. Abnormal returns equal annual buy-and-hold returns, net of size and book-tomarket matched portfolios (i.e., compounded monthly returns over the first year). Medians are reported for EBIT and leverage, and all other numbers represent means. 
Institutional
Post IPO-Returns and Institutional Holdings
The sample consists of 5907 IPOs between 1980 and 2000. We also separate the sample based on venture capital backing and size. Specifically, we place firms into groupings based on venture backing and also based on size, where firms are placed into one of three terciles, based on market capitalization at the institutional reporting date that occurs between one and four months after the IPO. Firms in the smallest tercile are labeled as small firms, and those in the largest tercile are labeled as large firms. For returns based on a three year (one quarter) horizon, we estimate weighted least squares regressions (where the weight equals the number of firms in the portfolio in each month) of monthly returns net of the risk-free rate on all firms that went public within the prior three years (one quarter) on four factors: the market return minus the risk-free rate (RMRF), returns on a portfolio of small firms minus returns on a portfolio of big firms (SMB), returns on a high BM portfolio minus returns on a low BM portfolio (HML), and returns on a high momentum portfolio minus returns on a low momentum portfolio (PR12). Intercepts from these regressions are shown in the first two panels of the table. For the third panel, 13f institutional holdings are based on shares held by institutions, after excluding venture capitalists and institutions that own more than 15% of the public float. These shares are divided by the public float, equal to offering size including the estimated over-allotment option, to obtain percent institutional holdings. These holdings are similarly measured at the first institutional holdings reporting date. 
All Firms
. We use the regression residual for each firm to group firms into quintiles, where Quintile 1 (Q1) represents firms with the lowest residual institutional ownership, and Quintile 5 (Q5) represents firms with the highest residual institutional ownership. The first column represents all IPO firms, while the second and third represent IPOs that are venture backed and non-venture backed, respectively. We also separate the sample on size. Specifically, we categorize firms into terciles, based on market capitalization at the institutional reporting date. For the one-quarter horizon, we regress monthly equal-weighted returns on the high institutional holdings quintile minus the low institutional holdings quintile for firms that went public within the prior three months on four factors: the market return minus the risk-free rate (RMRF), returns on a portfolio of small firms minus returns on a portfolio of big firms (SMB), returns on a high BM portfolio minus returns on a low BM portfolio (HML), and returns on a high momentum portfolio minus returns on a low momentum portfolio (PR12). Intercepts from these regressions are shown in the Table 4 for description of quintile formation. For the one quarter horizon, we regress equalweighted monthly returns net of the risk-free rate on firms in each of the institutional holdings for firms that went public within the prior three months on four factors: the market return minus the risk-free rate (RMRF), returns on a portfolio of small firms minus returns on a portfolio of big firms (SMB), returns on a high BM portfolio minus returns on a low BM portfolio (HML), and returns on a high momentum portfolio minus returns on a low momentum portfolio (PR12). Intercepts from these regressions are shown in the The sample consists of 5907 IPOs between 1980 and 2000. In the first column, percent institutional holdings is regressed on various firm and offer characteristics. Percent institutional holdings equals shares held by institutions, after excluding venture capitalists and institutions that own more than 15% of the public float, divided by the public float, equal to offering size including the estimated size of the over-allotment option. These holdings are measured at the first institutional holdings reporting date that occurs between one and four months after the IPO. In the second column, the dependent variable is a dummy variable, equal to one of the firm had any institutional holdings as of this same date, and zero otherwise. Explanatory variables in these regressions represent information known at the time of the offering. Proceeds are the proceeds raised in the IPO and given in year 2000 million dollars. Firm age is the age of each firm at the time of the IPO. Underwriter Rank is the average Carter-Manaster underwriter ranking score, as updated by Loughran and Ritter (2004) . The dummy variable for venture capital backing equals one if the firm received venture capital investments before the IPO, and zero otherwise. The positive EBIT dummy equals one if EBIT in year t-1 is positive, and zero otherwise. Sales/assets , liabilities/assets, and working capital/assets are all measured at the end of the fiscal year ending prior to the IPO. Price Run-Up is the percent difference between the midpoint of the filing range and the offer price. Yearly dummies are included as additional explanatory variables but are not reported. T-statistics are given in parentheses. The sample consists of 5907 IPOs between 1980 and 2000. For underwriter rank, proceeds, and working capital (scaled by total assets), we divide the sample annually into two equal-sized groups, one group with an above-median score on the characteristic and the other with a below-median score on the characteristic. For venture capital backing, we break the sample into venture backed firms and non-venture backed firms. For earnings, we break firms into groups based on positive earnings (EBIT = 0) and negative earnings (EBIT < 0) in the year before the IPO. For underwriter rank, we form two portfolios: firms that have gone public within the past 36 months with an above-median underwriter, and firms that have gone public within the past 36 months with a below-median underwriter. We regress the monthly returns net of the risk-free rate on each of these portfolios on the three FamaFrench factors and the Carhart momentum factor. Intercepts from these regressions, with t-statistics in parentheses, are shown in the first two columns. Finally, the last column shows intercepts from a similar regression where the dependent variable is returns on the first portfolio minus returns on the second portfolio. Regression portfolios are constructed similarly for the other variables (VC backing, positive EBIT, etc.).
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High Quality Low Quality High minus Low Quality
Underwriter Rank (high quality = high rank) 
We use the regression residual for each firm to group firms into quintiles, where Quintile 1 (Q1) represents firms with the lowest residual institutional ownership, and Quintile 5 (Q5) represents firms with the highest residual institutional ownership. Finally, we calculate buy-and-hold and cumulative returns on Q5-Q1, over one quarter, one year, and three years following first the institutional holdings report date between one and four months after the IPO. Both raw returns and abnormal returns net of size and book-to-market matched portfolios are shown. For underwriter rank, proceeds, and working capital (scaled by total assets), we divide the sample annually into two equal-sized groups, one group with above-median score on the characteristic and the other with a below-median score on the characteristic. For venture capital backing, we break the sample into venture backed firms and non-venture backed firms. For earnings, we break firms into groups based on positive earnings (EBIT = 0) and negative earnings (EBIT < 0) in the year before the IPO. 
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